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Q: What is an emerging infectious dis-
ease or pathogen and why are these 
important for public health today? How 
did you become interested in researching 
these diseases?
A: An emerging disease or patho-
gen is a disease that is new, or has been 
detected in a new region or with mani-
festations that differ from what was previ-
ously recognized. I’ve been investigating 
outbreaks for much of my career, but I 
first experienced the major public health 
impact of an emerging infectious diseases 
outbreak in 2003, when we had a large 
avian influenza (A) H7N7 outbreak in 
the Netherlands and I was responsible 
for national laboratory preparedness and 
response. I realized how fast such events 
can develop, the difficulty of working 
with an unknown disease and the chal-
lenge of ensuring a coordinated response 
between veterinary and public health 
experts. We thought we were prepared, 
but it was not easy. Since then, I found 
similar challenges in the responses to 
the severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS) outbreak in 2003, a Marburg 
virus importation in 2008, other avian 
influenza virus outbreaks when the influ-
enza (A) H5N1 viruses started to spread 
from China, and in the responses to Ebola 
virus disease, Middle East Respiratory 
Syndrome (MERS) and Zika.
Q: How were you involved in these 
outbreaks?
A: When these outbreaks occurred, 
laboratories in the Netherlands had to be 
ready to test suspected cases. During the 
SARS outbreak, I was involved in risk as-
sessments of the potential for foodborne 
transmission. Regarding MERS and 
Zika, I was – and still am – involved in 
research with colleagues in the affected 
countries. During the 2014–16 Ebola 
outbreak, the Netherlands donated three 
mobile laboratories to Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, which were deployed and staffed 
by our medical centre.
Q: What are the public health challenges 
posed by emerging infectious diseases?
A: The main challenge is the frag-
mented way in which we do surveil-
lance and respond to outbreaks of these 
diseases. We have well-established and 
reasonably funded networks and labo-
ratories with defined roles and responsi-
bilities for vaccine-preventable diseases, 
foodborne diseases, some blood-borne 
diseases and, increasingly, antimicrobial 
resistance. However, they are not set up 
for general emerging disease prepared-
ness and response. Our disease–specific 
response is unsustainable and unneces-
sary. A public health laboratory should 
be able to detect many diseases with 
the resources and manpower currently 
used for one disease, in collaboration 
with animal and environmental health 
experts – this is known as the One 
Health approach. This generic model 
should be our goal. My view – and that of 
many of my colleagues – is that we need 
a publicly-funded network of expert 
centres in all regions that work together 
on a routine basis, not just when there 
is an outbreak, each working on many 
emerging infectious diseases.
Q: Doesn’t the Global Outbreak Alert 
and Response Network (GOARN) do this?
A: GOARN mobilizes experts from 
its network of institutions and labora-
tories around the world to respond to 
outbreaks in other countries. But this 
mechanism wrongly assumes that con-
tributing laboratories have funding for 
this response and lack only the means 
to invest in long-term capacity build-
ing. The ultimate goal should be to have 
sufficient regional capacity and links to 
centres of expertise around the world. 
That avoids the need for “flying laborato-
ries” and, of course, this requires reliable 
and long-term funding for the whole 
network. Some government and other 
health funders have realized this need 
and have recently set up a new funding 
mechanism to develop vaccines for pri-
ority emerging infectious diseases: the 
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness 
Innovations (CEPI). We need something 
similar for generic preparedness.
“A public health laboratory should be able 
to detect many diseases 
with the resources and 
manpower they currently 
use for one disease.”
Q: During the SARS outbreak in 2003, 
scientists agreed to share their findings, 
in particularly the genetic sequences of 
the pathogen, leading to its identifica-
tion. Is this a model that should be widely 
replicated?
A: The sharing of data for SARS was 
great and allowed scientists to identify 
the pathogen causing SARS. Yet in re-
ality this data sharing was limited to a 
small group of scientists and WHO, until 
their findings were published. At that 
time I was heading the emerging disease 
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laboratory response in the Netherlands 
and we did not have access to the infor-
mation we needed to do diagnostic tests 
for SARS, for example, for travellers. 
Research and the public health response 
need to be more closely linked as, for 
example, the EVD-LabNet in Europe 
for emerging viruses and laboratory 
preparedness, in which data is shared 
promptly. There are similar regional 
networks in other parts of the world.
Q: How can scientists be incentivized to 
act in the interests of public health?
A: Many scientists are interested in 
public health, but may not be familiar 
with how the public health sector works. 
The question of incentives is more com-
plex than public health versus academia. 
There is no single solution, but several 
potential solutions. These include data 
sharing platforms that work within a 
code of conduct and that facilitate the 
sharing and use of data among a range 
of stakeholders for public health action, 
while retaining the right to publication 
or set out rules for use by the private 
sector. An example of such rules is that 
sharing needs to be immediate in the 
case of a public health emergency. We 
are working on such a platform through 
a collaborative group in Europe called 
Compare.
Q: Indonesia refused to share data on 
A (H5N1) influenza virus arguing that 
its population would not benefit from 
new, expensive vaccines produced using 
their data. What is needed to incentiv-
ize countries to share their data with 
the international community to come 
up with shared solutions to emerging 
pathogens?
A: Withholding data is not the 
way forward, but the Indonesians had 
a point regarding affordability. On the 
other hand, we need private sector 
expertise to bring vaccines, diagnostics 
and therapeutics to the market, if their 
economic interests are not protected, 
they may not be interested. So a middle 
ground needs to be found. The current 
emphasis on access and benefit sharing, 
as envisaged by the Nagoya Protocol 
on Access to Genetic Resources is a step 
forward. This agreement makes national 
authorities, not individual scientists or 
institutions, responsible for deciding 
what is shared and what is not shared. 
But not all countries are signed up to it 
and the Nagoya protocol was not devel-
oped with infectious diseases in mind.
Q: You have been involved in the WHO 
R&D Blueprint project, can you tell what 
this is?
A: The R&D Blueprint project set 
out to evaluate what went wrong with 
recent outbreak responses, and how 
these should be done in future and to 
push for concrete action. The project’s 
priority list of about 10 emerging 
pathogens and the CEPI initiative to 
start developing vaccines for some pri-
ority diseases are good examples of such 
action. However, it is important to keep 
up the momentum, particularly for 
the practical side of preparedness and 
response. Global health security is as 
weak as the weakest links in the chain, 
so how do we build global disease pre-
paredness and response capacity that 
combines diagnostic preparedness 
with the ability to support outbreak 
research? Currently, the development 
of laboratory capacity is a local or 
national responsibility. So here, again, 
the plea for a global, publicly-funded 
network of emerging infectious disease 
preparedness and response hubs. Such 
a project needs dedicated staff, equip-
ment, facilities, data-sharing systems 
prepared during “peace time”, so that 
they can be deployed during outbreaks. 
Given that many new diseases arise 
from our interaction with animals, a 
significant part of this network should 
be dedicated to regionally dispersed 
One Health centres of excellence. This 
project may seem expensive, but is not 
when compared to the economic costs 
of recent major outbreaks.
“Global health security is as weak as 
the weakest links in the 
chain.”
Q: The 2014–16 West African Ebola 
outbreak, which was not recognized 
for months after the first cases, in-
curred huge economic costs.  How 
can least-developed countries with 
a weak infrastructure be expected to 
do the surveillance needed to detect 
outbreaks? Is implementation of the 
International Health Regulations (IHR) 
the solution?
A: IHR implementation is part 
of the solution, but preparedness and 
response will always be a low priority 
when there are so many more diseases 
to deal with every day. This dilemma 
is not limited to low-income settings. 
Clinicians and public health institutes 
across the world face the challenge of 
working with limited budgets, shift-
ing the emphasis to chronic diseases 
(often from the same budget), and the 
growing costs of health care due to the 
ageing population. WHO relies on many 
partners for the outbreak response, but 
does not have a mechanism to fund 
those response activities. That situation 
may have been acceptable in the past, 
but not for today’s emerging infectious 
diseases which require a more consistent 
approach.
Q: WHO was accused of scaremonger-
ing during the A (H1N1) 2009 influenza 
pandemic, as the illness turned out to 
be mild and case fatality was lower than 
expected. During the 2014–16 Ebola 
outbreak, WHO was accused of failing 
to pay enough attention. How do you 
decide which emerging infectious patho-
gens and outbreaks present a major risk 
for humans and merit action, without 
scaremongering?
A: It’s easy to judge events with 
hindsight. In 2009, the initial reports 
from Mexico were of great concern and 
it was difficult to assess the risk because 
there is no globally agreed way of assess-
ing severity during early stages of an 
outbreak unless you do a series of stud-
ies. Fortunately, the pandemic turned 
out to be milder than all the worst-case 
scenarios. But while a situation is evolv-
ing, you still have to decide on vaccine 
development for all scenarios. This was 
a global pandemic, so that assessment 
was right, although the severity predic-
tion was wrong.
Q: What is your view on the Global Virome 
Project to identify all potentially new and 
emerging viruses in the natural world?
A: This is an interesting research 
project, but I am sceptical about the 
claims made by some scientists that 
all emerging viruses can eventually be 
discovered. Virome studies are increas-
ingly popular and reveal that we are far 
from understanding the full spectrum of 
viral diversity. That said, I do believe in 
the power of metagenomic sequencing 
and other new technologies, preferably 
when these activities are integrated into 
the network that I would like to see 
develop. ■
Bull World Health Organ 2018;96:84–85| doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.18.03021886
News
